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The purpose of the article is to attempt to answer the question of
how the crisis affected the banking systems of cee countries, with
special emphasis on liquidity risk. It seems that this problem has
particularly affected emerging economies. First, the liquidity risk
began to exert considerable influence on the functioning banking
system and, indirectly, the whole economy. In this paper author
wanted to answer the following questions: What are the channels
of transmission systemic risk on cee markets? What is the role of
big world banking groups in these financial systems? This con-
cept is applied to ten Central Eastern European countries, which
experienced a financial crisis. In the research author hypothe-
sized about interconnectedness of liquidity in financial systems
and solvency problems of big banking groups operating in cee.
Key words: liquidity risk, financial crisis, contagion effect
Introduction
The banking sectors of cee countries have gone through a profound
transformation since the second half of the 1990s. Foreign ownership
levels are the highest in the world and bank credit to the private
sector has expanded rapidly in recent years. This well-documented
process, which was already apparent at the beginning of the decade,
became even stronger from 2004.
Most of the banking sectors of cee countries are dominated by
similar and aggressive business strategies of Western European
banking groups.
Rising ltd (Loan-to-Deposit) ratios therefore have required in-
creasing reliance on foreign funding channeled through the banking
sector. The relatively undeveloped state of domestic capital markets,
as a funding source in these countries, and easy access by the mostly
foreign-owned banks to cheap funding from their parents. The dif-
ferences in funding structures suggest that some countries are more
exposed than others to financial market disturbances originating
from advancedmarkets or to spillovers from problems in other coun-
tries in the region. Banking systems that are heavily dependent on
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foreign funding to support credit growth could face a sudden short-
fall or costly access to funds and experience difficulties in expanding
credit. While reputational risks and long-term business plans may
render it unlikely that parent banks would not support their daugh-
ters, the degree of their support depends on market conditions; as
funding conditions in home countries become more difficult. Liq-
uidity or solvency problems in a parent (which is measured by cds
spread in the market) could hence be transmitted to local banks in a
concentrated and largely foreign-owned banking system.
Financial stability is a base of each financial system to cope with
shocks and market imbalances, thus reducing the likelihood of dis-
ruption of financial intermediation process. Protection of financial
stability requires the identification of major sources of risk and vul-
nerability, such as the inefficiency of the allocation of financial re-
sources from savers to investors, valuation and bad financial risk
management. Identification of risk and sensitivity is needed, be-
cause overseeing financial stability must be a pre-emptive. Ineffi-
ciency in the allocation of capital or shortcomings in the valuation
and risk management could undermine the future stability of the fi-
nancial system, and therefore economic stability.
The depth and scale of the current financial crisis has shown
clearly that the globalization of markets financial economic system
has created a lot of dangerous.
Particular importance for financial system stability is to maintain
stability of the banking system. Banks play a key role in financing
the economy and settlements of payment. The important function of
banks is also creating products that enable financial risk manage-
ment for others. For these reasons there will be especially strong
emphasis on analysis and evaluation of stability of banking system.
Due to the very low level of interest rates inmajor world economies
to tackle the feedback process indicated by conventional monetary
policy tools are limited. The realization of such a negative scenario
could lead to the materialization of credit and liquidity risk in the
cee banking sector. Under conditions of increased global risk aver-
sion, banks could face difficulties with the renewal of swap opera-
tions to safeguard the risks, associated with foreign currency loans
portfolio, as well as the renewal of funding derived from the finan-
cial markets in a different form. Strong growth in risk aversion also
would involve the intensification of market pressure on European
banks deleveraging, particularly visible in a further increase in the
cost of market financing, the reduced availability and shorter matu-
rity. Under such conditions, the cost and availability of funding pro-
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vided by the subsidiaries of strategic investors in the cee countries
could become worse. An additional cause of deleveraging European
banks may be increased capital adequacy requirements, especially
in a situation, when banks were not able to raise capital by issu-
ing shares, or conversion of other liabilities items (e. g. subordinated
debt) in capital quality. Deleveraging may take the form of changes
in the structure of assets in the direction of growth of low risk
weights items, which may induce banks to reduce their exposures to
subsidiaries operating in other countries. Existing still uncertainty
about the implementation of fiscal consolidation in the euro area
countries with high debt also indicates that the likelihood of wors-
ening debt crisis in these countries, combined with an increase in
volatility in financial markets has increased and remains at elevated
levels. The strength of disorder may depend on the changes in fi-
nancial position of strategic investors, banks operating in the cee
countries, as well as the actions taken by the economic authorities
of home countries of these institutions. Banks do not have sufficient
liquidity buffers, which could cover a possible outflow of funds as-
sociated with the scenario withdrawal of foreign capital. It leads to
systemic liquidity problems in cee banking systems. There is also
the risk of changes in ownership in cee banks. Some banks, strate-
gic investors in the cee region, despite the high profitability, it may
decide to sell the subsidiaries under the restructuring of its activ-
ities. As the financial situation of some dominant shareholders of
the banks operating in the cee countries, is a difficult decision to
sell its shares may also be enforced by the regulator of the home
country (in response to large capital requirements) or (in case of
involvement of public funds) by the European Commission. The
process of any changes of ownership, however, is associated with
the risk of decline in confidence in banks that are in the process
of selling, due to the increased likelihood of changes in ownership
in cee countries.
Literature Review
The last global financial turmoil provoked debates about controlling
systemic risk with financial monitoring, regulations and network ap-
proach. In many countries the financial crises can be considered as
realizations of the systemic risk in the financial system. Lo (2008)
proposes a set of measures for systemic risk, which are leverage,
liquidity, correlation, concentration, sensitivities and connectedness.
The systemic risk studies have generally focused on interbank mar-
kets; exposures among different banks have the strong potential for
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contagion in the case of a banking failure (Rochet and Tirole 1996).
Another presents systemic liquidity approach, which takes into ac-
count the liquidity of banks in the interbank market linkages (Allen
and Gale 2000). It has a dual character. First – the banks respond
similarly to changes in the macroeconomic environment. This is due
to the similarity of the structure of the balance sheets of banks and
their functions in the economy (withdrawal of bank deposits may
occur at the same time and in extreme cases leads to the so-called
run on banks). Second, the lack of ability to discharge liabilities of
the bank to other banks may lead to liquidity problems in banks-
creditors. This phenomenon is called domino effect of the lack of
liquidity.
There is a lot of research describing difficulty in maintaining liq-
uidity in banking system. For example Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
construct a model of the economy which allowed them to analyze
the dynamics of deposits in banks, deposit insurance role in pre-
venting phenomenon of ‘run on the banks,’ and the role of lender
of last resort. Allen and Gale (2000) enrich the model Diamond and
Dybviga (1983), adding the interbank market. This allows answer-
ing the question, whether the banking system can deal with liquid-
ity problems itself, without assistance such as the central bank. As-
sumptions of the model described by Diamond and Dybviga (1983)
and Allen and Gale (2000) were subjected to criticized and modified
in many publications (e. g. Diamond and Rajan 1999; Kiyotaki and
Moore 1997; Postlewaite and Vives 1987; Acharya 2009).
Another study investigated systemic risk and contagion by using
network theory (Nier et al. 2007; Árvai, Driessen, and Öther-Robe
2009). Banks were modeled as nodes of a network and they have
two types of assets that were interbank assets and external assets. A
shock was given to the external assets of one bank and the effects of
this shock were observed by simulation.
Interbank credit lines are introduced as a channel of contagion
(Müller 2006). A bank’s failure creates contagion not only through
its liabilities but also through the dry up of credit lines of the failed
bank to other banks. Interbank exposures and credit lines channels
are modeled distinctly.
Recent global financial crisis raised new questions. New meth-
ods on financial modeling and systemic risk calculation have been
searched to increase the foresight of academic work. Most distur-
bances move in a particular group of countries, and the mechanism
of contagion model assumes a correlation between market volatility
of countries with similar macroeconomic risk.
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Purpose of the Study and Methodology
In my study I aim to find out how the solvency crisis of big bank-
ing groups, operating in the European market, caused the liquidity
problem in cee financial systems. To the best of my knowledge the
analysis of the role of institutional factors in liquidity and stability
problems bank operating in the cee was not conducted thus far.
The analysis is based on data of financial systems available in the
Reuters Thomson database. The study sample is based on ten coun-
tries (selected due to limited accessibility of data for at least 7 years
time span – 2005–2011 years) – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovenia,
Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Romania. For
each country there was selected particular variables of its financial
system, which has influence on the banking system and economy:
main stock index changes, real effective exchange rate, interbank
short term interest rate 3m, cds spread of banking group operating
in cee financial systems, real gdp growth (table 1).
There will apply two types of econometric models. The first for
testing the association between liquidity problem in cee banking
systems and changes in interbank short term interest rates, stock
exchange index, real effective exchange rate as well as cds spread
of big banking groups operating in cee countries. Liquidity is mea-
sured as changes in relation of interbank assets to liabilities. The
other model, to find out whether variable from financial system af-
fect macroeconomy, measured as gdp growth. I apply gmm estima-
tors developed for dynamic models of panel data (Greene, 2012). The
table 1 Summary description of data
Country Short term ir Stock index 1 reer Time span
m sd m sd m sd
Bulgaria –0,25 0,61 –0,09 0,70 0,03 0,03 2005–2011
Czech Republic –0,35 0,67 –0,02 0,38 0,04 0,06 2005–2011
Slovak Republic –0,37 0,96 –0,06 0,18 –0,01 0,03 2005–2011
Hungary 0,00 0,27 0,02 0,43 0,01 0,06 2005–2011
Estonia –0,37 0,96 0,02 0,54 –0,01 0,03 2005–2011
Latvia –0,40 1,37 –0,02 0,41 0,03 0,05 2005–2011
Lithuania –0,18 0,69 0,00 0,54 0,02 0,04 2005–2011
Poland 0,00 0,21 0,05 0,40 0,02 0,09 2005–2011
Romania –0,05 0,21 –0,00 0,58 0,03 0,08 2005–2011
Slovenia –0,37 0,96 –0,05 0,56 –0,01 0,03 2005–2011
Total –0,23 0,75 –0,01 0,46 0,02 0,05 2005–2011
Continued on the next page
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table 1 Continued from the previous page
Country cds spread Liq. interb. gdp growth Time span
m sd m sd m sd
Bulgaria 0.45 0.97 0.03 0.59 0.03 0.05 2005–2011
Czech Republic 0.43 0.83 0.08 0.44 0.03 0.04 2005–2011
Slovak Republic 0.23 0.91 0.92 0.31 0.05 0.05 2005–2011
Hungary 0.34 0.93 0.32 0.14 0.01 0.04 2005–2011
Estonia 0.35 0.97 0.29 0.32 0.03 0.09 2005–2011
Latvia 0.23 0.93 0.12 0.24 0.02 0.10 2005–2011
Lithuania 0.25 0.94 0.56 0.24 0.03 0.08 2005–2011
Poland 0.23 0.91 0.34 0.19 0.05 0.02 2005–2011
Romania 0.32 0.98 0.37 0.18 0.03 0.05 2005–2011
Slovenia 0.25 0.92 0.35 0.32 0.02 0.05 2005–2011
Country 0.31 0.93 0.64 0.61 0.03 0.06 2005–2011
notes m – median, sd – standard deviation.
liquidity (equation 1) and macroeconomy (equation 2) models, re-
spectively, read as:












where, indices i and t refer to country and time, respectively; Liquid
_interbanki,t – a relation of interbank assets to liabilities; Short_iri,t
– a logarytm of interbank short rate (3m); Stock_inxi,t−1 a loga-
rytm of main country stock index; Reeri,t – real effective exchange
rate; cds_spreadi,t a logarytm of average bank cds spread (Uni-
credit; Raiffeisen; Erste; Societe Generale; Swedbank; Citibank;
Commerzbank; efg Eurobank, Santander bank, Rabobank, bnp Pa-
ribas); gdp_growtht,i is real gdp growth;
∑2010
t=1996Tt – a set of dummy
time variables; ϑi – unobservable country specific effects that are
constant over time but vary across countries; εi,t sa – white noise er-
ror term. In the models it is also regress interbank liquidity on gdp
and gdp growth on interbank liquidity to find out whether liquidity
and macroeconomic risks are interconnected.
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table 2 Estimation results for cee countries
Dependent
variable
Liquidity (equation 1) Marcoeconomic (equation 2)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Const 0,002 0,1634 0,01023 0,14684
Short_ir –0,456 0,0037*** 0,02067 0,00943***
Stock_inx_1 0,0204 0,0912** 0,17307 <0,00001***
Reer 0,8376 0,0002*** 0,70312 0,00145***
cds_spread –0,915 0,0045*** –0,8440 0,0012***
Liquid_interbank –0,0125 0,1010*
gdp_growth 0,0400 0,7500
ar(1)z 1,2392 [0.2153] 0,1607 [0.5488]
ar(2)z 1,7987 [0.0456] 0,2164 [0.6509]
R2 0,9313 0,6898
notes Significance: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. First and second lags of de-
pendent variable were included but not reported.
Results
Whereas table 2 reports findings of the study, the analysis shows that
cds_spread exerts negative impact on gdp growth and interbank liq-
uidity. Real effective exchange rate seems to be an important and
significant enhancing determinant of liquidity and macroeconomy
(coefficients for Interbank liquidity and gdp growth are, 0.8376 and
0.70312, respectively). This can be due the increase (decrease) in
foreign capital flows during upturns (downturns) and stock market
boom (bust). Stock exchange changes does not affect so hardly on
liquidity decisions of banks. It is not surprising the result obtained
on the changes in interest rates, as in all countries can be observed
significant growth 3m rates accompanying decline in banking sys-
tem liquidity.
The research supports hypothesis about interconnectedness of
liquidity in financial systems and solvency problems of big banking
groups operating in cee.
As the results show one of the potential sources of systemic risk
in the cee countries is the financial situation of European banking
groups, particularly those with their subsidiaries in cee. The dete-
rioration of European banks may affect the banking sector, among
others by reducing the availability of funding parent companies and
other financial institutions and by increasing the cost of market fi-
nancing. Difficulties in obtaining capital from market sources and
the limited possibilities of recapitalization of banks due to the dif-
ficult fiscal situation will cause home countries, that parent banks
may be forced to intensify the deleveraging process by reducing the
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scale of operations, and sales subsidiaries. Parent banks that have
received state aid may also be forced to sell some assets. Market
financing costs are high, especially for banks from countries with
public finance crisis risk. Banks’ funding costs are highly dependent
on risk assessment and cost of financing the government sector of
their home countries. Strong growth in profitability and cds premi-
ums of some Euro area countries in the second half of 2011 resulted
in increased funding costs of banks. This illustrates the significant
increase in the cds premium during the same period for most Eu-
ropean banks. As a result of the deterioration of the fiscal situation
of some Euro area countries, the rating agencies downgraded their
credit assessment, which led to a reduction in the ratings of banks
operating in these countries. Concerns about the fiscal situation of
some countries of the Euro area resulted in an increased risk of bank
losses in the event of fall in the value of Treasury bonds, and also
limited the possibility of providing further public support for endan-
gered financial institutions. Share prices of most European banks
recorded a strong decline, especially banks with significant expo-
sures to risk of Euro area countries and banks perceived as having
an unstable situation of liquidity.
Also, the cds premium quotations of parent companies are strong-
ly associated with cds premiums on their government debt. The sol-
vency problem of some Euro area countries can decrease market
assessments of financial sector companies, which worsen the con-
ditions for the functioning of both parent companies and their affili-
ates. The reduction in lending will further restrict economic activity
leading to a negative feedback loop between the financial and real
sectors. Ratings of parent companies for cee banks persist at low
levels, especially in comparison with the period before the outbreak
of financial crisis. High levels of cds premium of certain parent com-
panies has a significant influence liquidity in banking system, due to
the high probability of insolvency of parent companies.
The results of the estimation models (equations 1 and 2) show
that the most important influence on liquidity in cee interbank mar-
ket have: cds spread on major banking group operating in Europe
and the real effective exchange rate (coefficients of cds spread and
real effective exchange rate are, –0.91 and 0.83, respectively). Much
smaller influence presents gdp growth (0,04) and changes in the
capital markets (0,02) (see table 2). The reason of this situation was
in the past. Years 2007–2008 is a dynamic growth in loans and grow-
ing at a relatively lower rate of bank deposit base contributed to the
widening funding gap (the ratio of loans to deposits on the interbank
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market). Banks ‘closing’ the gap by borrowing funds in the interbank
markets both at home and abroad, attracting deposits from non-
bank financial institutions. The stability of such a model of funding
was disrupted in September 2008, the collapse of us bank Lehman
Brothers, which contributed to a significant increase in counterparty
risk in global markets, reducing transaction limits and decline the
interbank liquidity in financial markets. The consequence of distur-
bances in the international markets was reducing the mutual lim-
its of the interbank transactions in local markets in the cee region.
The liquidity of the interbank market increased the market price of
short-term transactions (up to 3m). The study of short-term inter-
est rates in the interbank market in cee region showed a signifi-
cant increase in rates at this time. Low limits on interbank trans-
actions could also due to the increased difficulties in assessing the
credit risk of local banks’ customers and hence, future financial po-
sition of banks themselves. It was difficult to determine security of
credit portfolios and capital adequacy in particular banks. This was
reflected in the increase in risk premiums and the cost of obtaining
financing. Banks earn a lot of resources at a price above the level
of interbank rates. Lack of trust between banks led to a increasing
risk premium in interbank rates. The reaction of banks to reduce the
possibility of ‘closing’ the funding gap in the wholesale markets was
similar, and practically uniform across cee countries.
The fast convergence in credit ratios is mainly driven by simi-
lar and aggressive business strategies of Western European banking
groups that dominate the banking sectors of most cee countries. For
the banks with smaller relative presence in the region, vulnerabil-
ity to contagion from mother to subsidiary banks is more relevant,
while in the case of truly regional banks contagion is likely in both
directions with potential spillover across subsidiaries as well.
Conclusion
The focus has been on how the statistical characteristics of a mar-
ket’s constituents and the nature of their interconnectedness affect
the tradeoff between banks for contagion. It has been proven that
in cee parent model of banks leads to the contagion and liquidity
problems, in interbank lending market. The process of internation-
alization in the banking sector in cee countries has facilitated the
development of banking and integration into the global system of
capital flows. The presence of foreign capital in the banking sector,
however, are related to concerns about: the deterioration of domestic
banks operating conditions due to intense competition from foreign
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institutions, the difficulties in conducting monetary policy, system
instability, the reluctance to finance investments by foreign banks.
The study shows that the situation and solvency problem in big
banking groups operating in Central and Eastern Europe, measured
by cds spreads exerts negative impact on liquidity in local finan-
cial systems, where they have subsidiaries. There is not connected
with economic problem in particular countries, but it was so called
contagion effect This can be due the increase (decrease) in foreign
capital flows during upturns (downturns) and stock market boom
(bust). Stock exchange changes does not affect so hardly on liquid-
ity decisions of banks. It is not surprising the result obtained on the
changes in interest rates, as in all countries can be observed signif-
icant growth 3m rates accompanying decline in banking system liq-
uidity. The research supports hypothesis about interconnectedness
of liquidity in financial systems and solvency problems of big bank-
ing groups operating in cee.
The high degree of financial interlinkages in the region and the
risk of regional contagion argue strongly for a more regional ap-
proach to managing potential vulnerabilities. In addition to strength-
ening bank supervision and prudential regulation is needed close
cooperation between home and host supervisory authorities. Ini-
tiatives are needed to develop cooperative arrangements for crisis
management, some of which are already taking place. At a minimum,
this calls for conducting coordinated inspections of internationally
active banks and undertaking joint risk assessments.
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